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Autoren: 
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Stiehler, Andreas
Datum: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 2002,18
Zusammenfassung: 
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly endowed participants encounter repeatedly the weakest link-, the usual average contribution- and the best shot-technology of public good provision in a within subject-design. Some striking findings are that the weakest link-technology fares much better than the other two technologies in terms of welfare, and that the willingness to voluntarily contribute is greatly affected by the (increasing or decreasing) clock mechanism.
Schlagwörter: 
Public goods
Voluntary contributions
Efficient provision
Clock mechanism
JEL: 
C72
C92
H41
D44
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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