Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64518 
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dc.contributor.authorCason, Timothy N.en
dc.contributor.authorFriedman, Danielen
dc.contributor.authorHopkins, Eden
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-28-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:41:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:41:43Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64518-
dc.description.abstractWe report laboratory experiments that use new, visually oriented software to explore the dynamics of 3 x 3 games with intransitive best responses. Each moment, each player is matched against the entire population, here 8 human subjects. A heat map offers instantaneous feedback on current profit opportunities. In the continuous slow adjustment treatment, we see distinct cycles in the population mix. The cycle amplitude, frequency and direction are consistent with standard learning models. Cycles are more erratic and higher frequency in the instantaneous adjustment treatment. Control treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) replicate previous results that exhibit weak or no cycles. Average play is approximated fairly well by Nash equilibrium, and an alternative point prediction, TASP (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon), captures some regularities that NE misses.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of California, Economics Department |cSanta Cruz, CAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x702en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.subject.keywordlearningen
dc.subject.keywordmixed equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordcontinuous timeen
dc.titleCycles and instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors population game: A continuous time experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn722373996en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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