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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Henwood, Keith | en |
dc.contributor.author | Friedman, Daniel | en |
dc.contributor.author | Oprea, Ryan | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-23 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-28T12:41:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-28T12:41:33Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64506 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These findings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of California, Economics Department |cSanta Cruz, CA | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x658 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | evolutionary dynamics | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Hawk-Dove game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | game theory | en |
dc.subject.keyword | laboratory experiment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | continuous time game | en |
dc.subject.stw | Dynamisches Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.title | Separating the hawks from the doves | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 616908881 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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