Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62905 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 563
Publisher: 
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics, London
Abstract: 
I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalised in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that for each feasible (finite) choice situation, the choice coincides with the uncovered set of T. This notion of rationality explains not only cyclical and context dependent choices observed in practice, but also provides testable restrictions on observable choice behavior.
Subjects: 
Rationalizability, Uncovered set, Intransitive choice
JEL: 
D01
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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