Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62817
Autor:innen: 
Bosch-Domènech, Antoni
Vriend, Nicolaas J.
Datum: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 621
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics, London
Zusammenfassung: 
Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closely related small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well as experimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordination devices.
Schlagwörter: 
Coordination game
Focal point
Nash equilibrium
Equilibrium selection
Coordination device
JEL: 
C72
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
524.42 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.