Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62755
Authors: 
Grimm, Veronika
Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,70
Abstract: 
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial phase of that auction, which have puzzled several observers. In addition, the paper evaluates the merit of the German UMTS auction design, relative to the English design, that was predominantly employed in Europe.
Subjects: 
auctions
telecommunications
industrial organization
game theory
JEL: 
D43
D44
D45
H20
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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