Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62258
Authors: 
Grimm, Veronika
Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,19
Abstract: 
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.
Subjects: 
auctions
mechanism design
natural oligopoly
entry
JEL: 
D43
D44
D45
H20
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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