Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62080
Authors: 
Sonntag, Diana
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Transfers F02-V2
Abstract: 
This paper demonstrates why an increased quantity of funding as claimed by big health lenders is not effective to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). An alternative funding mechanism linking the disbursement of matching grants with a minimum provision level is suggested. In order to study the impact of conditional subsidies on the efficiency of international health-promoting public goods, non-cooperative multi-stage games are analyzed. In the participation stage, a subsidy which is contingent on some minimum provision level is determined. In later stages countries choose their contributions to a health-promoting public good and receive a subsidy if their supply is no less than a predetermined threshold. The analyses indicate that efficient provision levels can be achieved.
JEL: 
H87
F35
I18
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
72.81 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.