Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62044
Authors: 
Stoll, Sebastian
Zöttl, Gregor
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Procurement B05-V1
Abstract: 
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the bidders, on buyers welfare and platform turnovers. First we show that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals characteristics and the buyers preferences over those non-price characteristics. In a counterfactual analysis we then analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. As we find, platform turnovers would decrease from around 10 million euros to around 7 million euros and the buyers welfare would increase by the monetary equivalent of around 2.7 million euros.
JEL: 
D44
D82
L11
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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