Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62018
Authors: 
Buck, Florian
Schliephake, Eva
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Financial Market Regulation A18-V3
Abstract: 
The paper argues that national regulators can improve the stability of the domestic banking sector via two substitutable policy instruments; minimum capital requirements and effort spend on domestic supervision. Both tools increase the soundness of a national banking system, but they imply different cost burdens between domestic banks and taxpayers. The optimal domestic policy choice is characterised by trading off marginal costs and benefits born by each party. However, the optimal policy choice changes if banks are allowed to be mobile. We show that countries are better off by harmonising capital requirements on an international standard la Basel, since harmonisation counters a regulatory race with other jurisdictions and will increase national utility.
JEL: 
G18
L51
D78
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.