Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61717
Authors: 
Berninghaus, Siegfried
Güth, Werner
Keser, Claudia
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1999,90
Abstract: 
We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture. However, we observe a significant amount of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, when compared with decentralized bargaining, has no significant effect on the payoffs of the players in the joint venture but reduces the payoff of the third player.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Joint Venture
Merger
Experiments
Equilibrium Selection
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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