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dc.contributor.authorCogley, Timothyen
dc.contributor.authorMatthes, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorSbordone, Argia M.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-30-
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:35:07Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:35:07Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60829-
dc.description.abstractWe model transitional dynamics that emerge after the adoption of a new monetary policy rule. We assume that private agents learn about the new policy via Bayesian updating, and we study how learning affects the nature of the transition and the choice of a new rule. Temporarily explosive dynamics can emerge when there is substantial disagreement between actual and perceived policies. These dynamics make the transition highly volatile and dominate expected loss. The emergence of temporarily explosive paths depends more on uncertainty about policy-feedback parameters than about the long-run inflation target. For that reason, the central bank can at least achieve low average inflation. Its ability to move feedback parameters away from initial beliefs, however, is more constrained.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report |x524en
dc.subject.jelE31en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinflationen
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policyen
dc.subject.keywordlearningen
dc.subject.keywordpolicy reformsen
dc.subject.keywordtransitionsen
dc.titleOptimal disinflation under learning-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn675784476en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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