Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/60601 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorEggertsson, Gauti B.en
dc.contributor.authorLe Borgne, Ericen
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:26:09Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:26:09Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60601-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician endogenously gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. Applied to monetary policy, this theory (i) formalizes the rationale for delegation highlighted by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, and by Alan S. Blinder, former Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and (ii) does not rely on the inflation bias that underlies most existing theories of central bank independence. Delegation trades off the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long-term job contract against the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) has less incentive to pander to public opinion than a politician. Our key theoretical predictions are broadly consistent with the dataen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report |x205en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.jelE61en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelJ45en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen
dc.subject.stwWahlen
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleThe politics of central bank independence: A theory of pandering and learning in government-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn482609478en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
431.22 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.