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Autoren: 
Jovanovic, Dragan
Wey, Christian
Datum: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 64
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the efficiency defense in merger control. First, we show that the relationship between exogenous efficiency gains and social welfare can be non-monotone. Second, we consider both endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiencies and find that merger proposals are largely aligned with a proper social welfare analysis which explicitly considers the without merger counterfactual. We demonstrate that the merger specificity requirement does not help much to select socially desirable mergers; to the contrary, it may frustrate desirable mergers inducing firms not to claim efficiencies at all.
Schlagwörter: 
Horizontal Mergers
Efficiency Defense
Merger Specific Efficiencies
JEL: 
K21
L13
L41
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-063-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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