Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGermano, Fabrizioen_US
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Martinen_US
dc.description.abstractWithin a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under different ownership structures. Assuming advertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of owners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from self-censorship could be empirically large.en_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1518en_US
dc.subject.keywordmedia economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmedia consolidationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmedia marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordadvertising and commercial media biasen_US
dc.titleConcentration and self-censorship in commercial mediaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

Files in This Item:
493.86 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.