Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59670 
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dc.contributor.authorLoeper, Antoineen
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-08-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:15Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:15Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59670-
dc.description.abstractThis paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient federal authority. We show that even if the size of the information to be elicited is minimal, the incentive compatibility constraint has a bite in terms of flexibility and welfare. Strategy-proof and efficient federal mechanisms are necessarily uniform. There exists inefficient and non-uniform strategy-proof mechanisms, but they are socially worse than non cooperative decentralization. Federal mechanisms which are neutral and robust to coalition manipulations are equivalent to voting rules on uniform policies.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1521en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordFederalismen
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen
dc.subject.keywordStrategy-proofnessen
dc.subject.keywordExternalityen
dc.subject.keywordCoordinationen
dc.subject.keywordUniformityen
dc.titleContractual federalism and strategy-proof coordination-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn651736129en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1521en

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