Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59669 
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dc.contributor.authorHarstad, Bården
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:14Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59669-
dc.description.abstractI investigate when side payments facilitate cooperation in a context with strategic delegation. On the one hand, allowing side payments may be necessary when one party's participation constraint otherwise would be violated. On the other, with side payments each principal appoints a delegate that values the project less, because this increases her bargaining power. Reluctant agents, in turn, implement too few projects. I show that side payments are bad if the heterogeneity is small while the uncertainty and the typical value of the project are large.With a larger number of parties there may be a stalemate without side payments, but delegation becomes more strategic as well, and cooperation decreases in either caseen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1452en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelF53en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwGruppenentscheidungen
dc.subject.stwKompensationslösungen
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDo side payments help? Collective decisions and strategic delegation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587665408en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1452en

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