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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59495
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol | en |
dc.contributor.author | McLean, Richard P. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-15 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-25T12:01:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-25T12:01:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59495 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We prove the existence of strategically stable sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence the existence of pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibria) in potential games that admit an upper semicontinuous potential, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. In addition, we provide a link between upper semicontinuity of a potential and conditions defined directly on the payoff functions of a potential game. Finally, we show that stable sets and (strictly) perfect equilibria are related to the set of maximizers of a potential, which refines the set of Nash equilibria. Specifically, the set of maximizers of a potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium) and, for generic games, any maximizer of a potential is a pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibrium. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJ | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x2011-25 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | discontinuous game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | potential game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | trembling-hand perfect equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | stable set | en |
dc.subject.keyword | essential equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nash-Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 662136764 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:rut:rutres:201125 | en |
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