Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59481 
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dc.contributor.authorCarbonell-Nicolau, Oriolen
dc.contributor.authorMcLean, Richarden
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-26-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T11:57:29Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T11:57:29Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59481-
dc.description.abstractWe provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed, and compare these conditions to those considered in the related literature. We then prove existence results for a new finitistic infinite-game generalization of Selten's [17] notion of perfection, and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2011-28en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddiscontinuous gameen
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibrium correspondenceen
dc.subject.keywordpayoff securityen
dc.subject.keywordtrembling-hand perfect equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordlimit-of-finite perfect equilibriumen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleApproximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn667078568en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:201128en

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