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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2011-28
Verlag: 
Rutgers University, Department of Economics, New Brunswick, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed, and compare these conditions to those considered in the related literature. We then prove existence results for a new finitistic infinite-game generalization of Selten's [17] notion of perfection, and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification.
Schlagwörter: 
discontinuous game
Nash equilibrium correspondence
payoff security
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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