Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57510
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dc.contributor.authorFischer, Svenen_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:39Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57510-
dc.description.abstractIn three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2011,34en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelJ52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordexclusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordultimatum gameen_US
dc.subject.stwUltimatumspielen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleEffects of exclusion on social preferencesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn682042196en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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