Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57510 
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dc.contributor.authorFischer, Svenen
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-02-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:39Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57510-
dc.description.abstractIn three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2011,34en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelJ52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordexclusionen
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordultimatum gameen
dc.subject.stwUltimatumspielen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleEffects of exclusion on social preferences-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn682042196en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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