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dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixen
dc.contributor.authorKranz, Sebastianen
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-09-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:23Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57502-
dc.description.abstractA fully unbundled, regulated network firm of unknown efficiency level can undertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g., by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to the firm contingent on realized downstream prices. Alternatively, the regulator can propose to the firm to sell the following forward contracts: the firm pays the downstream price to the owners of a contract, but receives the expected value of the contracts when selling them to a competitive financial market. We compare the two regulatory tools with respect to regulatory capture: if the regulator can be bribed to suppress information on the underlying state of the world (the basic probability of high downstream prices, or the type of the firm), optimal regulation uses forward contracts only.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2011,9en
dc.subject.jelK23en
dc.subject.jelL94en
dc.subject.jelL43en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordincentive regulationen
dc.subject.keywordregulatory captureen
dc.subject.keywordvirtual power plantsen
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen
dc.subject.stwTermingeschäften
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätswirtschaften
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleUsing forward contracts to reduce regulatory capture-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn661845524en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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