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dc.contributor.authorWeinschenk, Philippen
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-12-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:30Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:30Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57475-
dc.description.abstractWe study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show that the second-best optimal contract is discriminatory. We investigate how limited liability or the threat of sabotage influences the team's problem. It is further shown that players who earn higher wages can be worse off than teammates with lower wages and that present-biased preferences can mitigate procrastination.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2011,13en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelJ71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordteam productionen
dc.subject.keywordpartnershipsen
dc.subject.keywordprocrastinationen
dc.subject.keywordcontract designen
dc.subject.keyworddiscriminationen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsgruppeen
dc.subject.stwProjektmanagementen
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleProcrastination in teams, contract design and discrimination-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn66403425Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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