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dc.contributor.authorDoherty, Neil A.en
dc.contributor.authorLaux, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorMuermann, Alexanderen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-08-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-20T17:09:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-20T17:09:31Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-241157en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57366-
dc.description.abstractInsurance contracts are often complex and difficult to verify outside the insurance relation. We show that standard one-period insurance policies with an upper limit and a deductible are the optimal incentive-compatible contracts in a competitive market with repeated interaction. Optimal group insurance policies involve a joint upper limit but individual deductibles and insurance brokers can play a role implementing such contracts for the group of clients. Our model provides new insights and predictions about the determinants of insurance.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aGoethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFS Working Paper |x2011/31en
dc.subject.jelD6en
dc.subject.jelG22en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDeductible Insuranceen
dc.subject.keywordUpper Limiten
dc.subject.keywordImplicit Insurance Contractsen
dc.subject.keywordInsurance Brokersen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwSelbstbeteiligungen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsvermittlungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInsuring non-verifiable losses-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn67942671Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:201131en

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