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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Popkova, Katherina | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-09 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-18T14:54:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-18T14:54:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57260 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyses the influence of the exchange rate regime of a country on the level of tolerated corruption with a special focus on the interdependency of monetary and fiscal policies. Using a simple theoretical framework based on Barro-Gordon-Model I compare independent monetary policy with a tight peg arrangement in order to find out which regime is more likely to induce governments to intensify the fight against corruption. It is shown that if corruption has a considerable positive impact on output, a tight peg regime can increase tolerated corruption. However, if corruption has a negative effect on output, a pegged exchange rate regime will lead to a lower level of tolerated corruption. The issue of particular interest appears to be the finding that a strong positive impact of corruption on output can induce governments to choose a pegging regime while a weak positive impact of corruption (and a negative influence of corruption even more) provides an incentive to keep monetary independence. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht |cSiegen | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge |x148-11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E58 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E61 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F33 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Exchange Rate Regime | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Monetary Policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Fiscal Policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Corruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wechselkurssystem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Stufenflexibilität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruptionsbekämpfung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Can the exchange rate regime influence corruption? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 671799355 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:sie:siegen:148-11 | en |
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