Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56876
Authors: 
Wangler, Leo
Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2011,038
Abstract: 
This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. Relevant are the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations.
Subjects: 
international environmental agreements
coalition formation
coalition stability
environmental policy-making
strategic delegation
interest groups
free-rider incentives
determinants of international environmental cooperation
public goods experiments
JEL: 
D72
D62
C72
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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