Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56570
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Grigoryan, Artur | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-04T13:56:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-04T13:56:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56570 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. It also focuses on the role of elections as a basic mechanism to control and discipline politicians. I show that the politician has incentives for strategic behaviour if voters have incomplete information about his competence. The paper also studies when the delegation of decision making power is socially optimal and under which circumstances it takes place. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aPhilipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics |cMarburg | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aMAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x17-2011 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D7 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E6 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G2 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) | en |
dc.subject.keyword | transparency | en |
dc.subject.keyword | policy delegation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | external management | en |
dc.subject.stw | Staatsfonds | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperative Führung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomischer Anreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Incentives and the delegation of decision making power in sovereign wealth funds | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 657380016 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.