Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56570
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dc.contributor.authorGrigoryan, Arturen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04T13:56:03Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-04T13:56:03Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56570-
dc.description.abstractThe paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. It also focuses on the role of elections as a basic mechanism to control and discipline politicians. I show that the politician has incentives for strategic behaviour if voters have incomplete information about his competence. The paper also studies when the delegation of decision making power is socially optimal and under which circumstances it takes place.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics |cMarburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJoint discussion paper series in economics |x17-2011en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.jelE6en_US
dc.subject.jelF3en_US
dc.subject.jelG2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)en_US
dc.subject.keywordtransparencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy delegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordexternal managementen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatsfondsen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperative Führungen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIncentives and the delegation of decision making power in sovereign wealth fundsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn657380016en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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