Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56520 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 26-2010
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term. We find that IMF programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1.5 to 2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously. Furthermore, IMF programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the Fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances. Other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.
Schlagwörter: 
IMF programs
sovereign defaults
bivariate probit
international financial architecture
JEL: 
F33
F34
C25
C35
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
317.06 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.