Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56341 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 684
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Beauty contests are well-studied, dominance-solvable games that generate two interesting results. First, most behavior does not conform to the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior. In this work, we evaluate the relationship between beauty contest behavior and cognitive ability. We find that subjects with high cognitive ability exhibit behavior that is closer to the Nash equlibrium. We examine this finding through the prism of economic and biological theory.
Schlagwörter: 
beauty contest
rationality
cognitive ability
Nash equlibrium
JEL: 
C90
D01
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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