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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 529
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper reconsiders the classical problem of majority voting over tax schedules, adding the possibility to avoid taxes. In this setting preferences over tax schedules are not determined by earned income, but rather by taxable income, which depends on the joint decisions of labor supply and tax avoidance investments. The ordering of earned- and taxable income are shown to be the same if the tax avoidance function is log concave.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax avoidance
Majority voting
Order-restricted preferences
Single-crossing condition
JEL: 
C62
D70
H20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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