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dc.contributor.authorTercieux, Olivieren_US
dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Marken_US
dc.description.abstractIn a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the presence of at least one best response to such a belief. The purpose of this paper is to provide economically interesting classes of games in which minimal prep sets give sharp predictions, whereas in relevant subclasses of these games, minimal curb sets have no cutting power whatsoever and simply consist of the entire strategy space. These classes include potential games, congestion games with player-specific payoffs, and supermodular games.en_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x583en_US
dc.subject.keywordcurb setsen_US
dc.subject.keywordprep setsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpotential gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcongestion gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsupermodular gamesen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.titleThe cutting power of preparationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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