Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56197 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 583
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the presence of at least one best response to such a belief. The purpose of this paper is to provide economically interesting classes of games in which minimal prep sets give sharp predictions, whereas in relevant subclasses of these games, minimal curb sets have no cutting power whatsoever and simply consist of the entire strategy space. These classes include potential games, congestion games with player-specific payoffs, and supermodular games.
Schlagwörter: 
curb sets
prep sets
potential games
congestion games
supermodular games
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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