Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55597 
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dc.contributor.authorFuster, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Stephanen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T08:23:16Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-23T08:23:16Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55597-
dc.description.abstractMonetary incentives are often considered as a way to foster contributions to public goods in society and firms. This paper investigates experimentally the effect of monetary incentives in the presence of a norm enforcement mechanism. Norm enforcement through peer punishment has been shown to be effective in raising contributions by itself. We test whether and how monetary incentives interact with punishment and how this in turn affects contributions. Our main findings are that free riders are punished less harshly in the treatment with incentives, and as a consequence, average contributions to the public good are no higher than without incentives. This finding ties to and extends previous research on settings in which monetary incentives may fail to have the desired effect.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x09-2en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen
dc.subject.keywordnorm enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordhidden costs of incentivesen
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen
dc.subject.stwSoziales Verhaltenen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen
dc.titleAnother hidden cost of incentives: The detrimental effect on norm enforcement-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn593927435en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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