Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55203 
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dc.contributor.authorMatros, Alexanderen
dc.contributor.authorZapechelnyuk, Andriyen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-03-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-09T14:07:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-09T14:07:35Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55203-
dc.description.abstractIn e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geographic location of traders matters very little, fierce competition between providers of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show that two non-identical shops may coexist in equilibrium if the population of sellers is sufficiently differentiated in their time preferences. In such an equilibrium less patient sellers choose the more popular (with a higher rate of arrival of new buyers) and more expensive shop, while more patient sellers prefer the less popular and cheaper one.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance |cLondonen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x675en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworde-commerceen
dc.subject.keywordintermediaryen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen
dc.subject.keywordlisting feeen
dc.subject.keywordclosing feeen
dc.subject.stwE-Businessen
dc.subject.stwInformationsbeschaffungen
dc.subject.stwInterneten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.titleCompetition of e-commerce intermediaries-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn641019866en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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