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dc.contributor.authorGraf Lambsdorff, Johannen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:43Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55014-
dc.description.abstractThis study embeds transaction cost analysis into a Law and Economics model to produce general recommendations on how to deter bribery. Governments may deter bribery either by high penalties and risks of detection, potentially supported by leniency given to those who report their infraction (deterrence regime). Another local optimum is achieved if the government amplifies the risk of opportunism, aggravating the difficulties of enforcing a bribe transaction. This involves a low probability of detection and allowing offenders to keep their ill-gotten gains. If bribes are paid upfront bribe taking will face only mild punishment (constrained enforcement regime).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cPassauen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPassauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |xV-60-10en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBriberyen
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordLeniencyen
dc.subject.keywordEnforcementen
dc.subject.keywordDeterrenceen
dc.subject.keywordOpportunismen
dc.subject.keywordReportingen
dc.subject.keywordWhistle-blowingen
dc.subject.keywordNullityen
dc.titleDeterrence and constrained enforcement: Alternative regimes to deal with bribery-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn684338645en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V6010en

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