Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorGraf Lambsdorff, Johannen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:31Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006-
dc.description.abstractGovernments and private firms try to contain corruption among their staff mostly in a top-down, rules-based approach. They limit discretion, increase monitoring or impose harsher penalties. Principles-based, bottom-up approaches to anticorruption, instead, emphasize the importance of value systems and employee's intrinsic motivation. This embraces the invigorating of social control systems, encouraging whistle-blowing, coding of good practice and alerting to red flags. This paper investigates how some top-down measures run counter to bottom-up contributions. Examples range from penalties imposed with zero-tolerance, debarment or the nullity of contracts. While top-down elements are indispensable for containing corruption they must be designed well in order to avoid discouraging the bottom-up endeavors.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cPassauen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPassauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |xV-57-08en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordwhistle-blowingen
dc.subject.keywordcontract penaltiesen
dc.subject.keyworddebarmenten
dc.subject.keywordnullityen
dc.titleThe organization of anticorruption: Getting incentives right!-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn684336847en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5708en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
212.26 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.