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Gallego Álvarez, I.
García Sánchez, I. M.
Rodríguez Domínguez, L.
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[Journal:] Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa (IEDEE) [ISSN:] 1135-2523 [Volume:] 15 [Year:] 2009 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 109-135
The division between ownership and management and the existence of minority shareholders have led to the need for control systems which allow for the convergence of shareholders and managers' objectives. The disclosure of information for shareholders and corporate governance stand out among these control systems. This work analyses the nature of this relationship for non-financial Spanish quoted corporations. Unlike the current efforts devoted to improving both systems, our findings reveal a substitutive relationship, by showing the disclosure of less information in those companies whose Boards of Directors are more effective.
digital reporting
voluntary disclosure
the Internet
corporate governance
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