Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54346 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCooper, David J.en
dc.contributor.authorRebitzer, James B.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-06T14:13:46Z-
dc.date.available2012-01-06T14:13:46Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.isbn1931493146en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/54346-
dc.description.abstractThis brief considers the interaction between physician incentive systems and product market competition in the delivery of medical services via managed care organizations. At the center of the analysis is the process by which health maintenance organizations (HMOs) assemble physician networks and the role these networks play in the competition for customers. The authors find that although physician practice styles respond to financial incentives, there is little evidence that HMO cost-containment incentives cause a discernable reduction in care quality. They propose a model of the managed care marketplace that solves for both physician incentive contracts and HMO product market strategies in an environment of extreme information asymmetry: physicians perceive the quality of care they offer perfectly and their patients do not perceive it at all.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aLevy Economics Institute of Bard College |cAnnandale-on-Hudson, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPublic Policy Brief |x70en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwManaged Careen
dc.subject.stwÄrzteen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwKrankenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwDienstleistungsqualitäten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titlePhysician incentives in managed care organizations: Medical practice norms and the quality of care-
dc.typeResearch Reporten
dc.identifier.ppn515559768en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.