Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53932 
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dc.contributor.authorPaligorova, Teodoraen
dc.contributor.authorXu, Zhaoxiaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T12:58:23Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T12:58:23Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.34989/swp-2009-12en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53932-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the impact of pyramid ownership structure and multiple controlling shareholders on firm leverage. Pyramids, having at least one controlling shareholder and a subsidiary, rely significantly more on debt financing than non-pyramid firms. Moreover, higher leverage is observed in pyramids where the second controlling shareholders have more voting rights. We also find that the disparity between the voting rights of the first two controlling shareholders is negatively related to firm leverage. Interestingly, the influence of the second controlling shareholder is only present in non-family controlled pyramids. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that controlling shareholders in pyramids use debt to secure their private benefits.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBank of Canada |cOttawaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBank of Canada Working Paper |x2009-12en
dc.subject.jelG31en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordFinancial marketsen
dc.subject.keywordInternational topicsen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensfinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwFamilienunternehmenen
dc.subject.stwFremdkapitalen
dc.subject.stwG-7-Staatenen
dc.titleComplex ownership and capital structure-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn597607184en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:bca:bocawp:09-12en

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