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dc.contributor.authorAkerman, Andersen
dc.contributor.authorLarsson, Annaen
dc.contributor.authorNaghavi, Alirezaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-15-
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:33:44Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:33:44Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53350-
dc.description.abstractData on the growth performances of countries with similar comparative (dis)advantage and political institutions reveal a striking variation across world regions. While some former autocracies such as the East Asian growth miracles have done remarkably well, others such as the Latin American economies have grown at much lower rates. In this paper, we propose a political economy explanation of these diverging paths of development by addressing the preferences of the country's political elite. We build a theoretical framework where factors of production owned by the political elites differ across countries. In each country, the incumbent autocrat will cater to the preferences of the elites when setting trade policy and the property rights regime. We show how stronger property rights may lead to capital accumulation and labor reallocation to the manufacturing sector. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the comparative advantage, a decision to open up to trade and an inflow of more productive foreign capital. Consistent with a set of stylised facts on East Asia and Latin America, we argue that strong property rights are crucial for success upon globalization.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x65.2011en
dc.subject.jelF10en
dc.subject.jelF20en
dc.subject.jelP14en
dc.subject.jelP16en
dc.subject.jelO10en
dc.subject.jelO24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAutocracyen
dc.subject.keywordGrowthen
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Elitesen
dc.subject.keywordLandownersen
dc.subject.keywordCapitalistsen
dc.subject.keywordGrowth Miraclesen
dc.subject.keywordTradeen
dc.subject.keywordComparative Advantageen
dc.subject.keywordCapital Mobilityen
dc.subject.keywordProperty Rightsen
dc.subject.stwKomparativer Kostenvorteilen
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechten
dc.subject.stwKapitalmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwEliteen
dc.subject.stwAutoritäres Systemen
dc.subject.stwLateinamerikaen
dc.subject.stwOstasienen
dc.titleAutocracies and development in a global economy: A tale of two elites-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn668385804en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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