Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53327 
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dc.contributor.authorPartnoy, Franken
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:33:15Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:33:15Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53327-
dc.description.abstractThe first part of the paper describes how over time credit rating agencies ceased to play the role of information intermediaries. Rating agencies did not provide information about the risk associated with the securitized instruments, but they simply enabled structurers to create and maintain tranches of these instruments with unjustifiably high credit ratings. The second part of the paper suggests how future policy may minimize overdependence on credit ratings, by removing regulatory licences and by implementing shock-therapy mechanisms to wean investors simple rating mnemonics.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x27.2009en
dc.subject.jelG24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRating Agenciesen
dc.subject.keywordSubprime Mortgagesen
dc.subject.keywordSecuritizationen
dc.titleOverdependence on credit ratings was a primary cause of the crisis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn645049697en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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