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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53168
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Fumagalli, Chiara | en |
dc.contributor.author | Motta, Massimo | en |
dc.contributor.author | Rønde, Thomas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-12-15T11:30:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-12-15T11:30:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53168 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilano | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aNota di Lavoro |x120.2009 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L40 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L42 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Monopolization Practices | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Vertical Agreements | en |
dc.title | Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 646496905 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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