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dc.contributor.authorCandelon, Bertranden_US
dc.contributor.authorDupuy, Arnauden_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy with an implicit market for productive time. In this economy, agents have limited productive time and can choose to produce in autarky, buy productive time from helpers to increase own production or, sell their productive time to a leader and thereby give up own production. This implicit market gives rise to the formation of teams, organized in hierarchies with one leader at the top and helpers below. We show that relative to autarky, hierarchical organization leads to higher within and between team payoffs/productivity inequality. We investigate this link empirically in the context of road cycling. We show that the rise in performance inequality in the peloton since the 1970s is merely due to a rise in within team performance inequality and consistent with a change in the hierarchical organization of teams and an increase in the helping intensity within team.en_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5391en_US
dc.subject.keywordhierarchical organizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordproductive timeen_US
dc.subject.keywordhelping timeen_US
dc.subject.keywordprofessional cyclingen_US
dc.titleHierarchical organization and inequality in an economy with an implicit market for productive timeen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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