Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51756 
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dc.contributor.authorAlmeida, Rita K.en
dc.contributor.authorCarneiro, Pedroen
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-14-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:34:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:34:38Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201108152092en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51756-
dc.description.abstractEnforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5902en
dc.subject.jelJ2en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinformalityen
dc.subject.keywordlabor regulationen
dc.titleEnforcement of labor regulation and informality-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn669996955en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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