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dc.contributor.authorKovenock, Danen
dc.contributor.authorRoberson, Brianen
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-09T16:30:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-09T16:30:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51113-
dc.description.abstractThis paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment’s size.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2009-07en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelL30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordGet out the voteen
dc.subject.keywordredistributive politicsen
dc.subject.keywordnonprofit advocacy organizationsen
dc.subject.keywordColonel Blotto gameen
dc.subject.keywordTullock gameen
dc.titleNon-partisan 'Get-out-the-vote' efforts and policy outcomes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:SPII200907en
dc.identifier.printppn614780926en

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