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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 33
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine a technology adoption game with network effects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We define a technology's critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make the choice of this technology a best response for any remaining user. We show that the technology with a lower critical mass is risk-dominant and is chosen by the maximin criterion. We present experimental evidence that both pay-off dominance and risk dominance explain participants' choices. The relative riskiness of a technology can be proxied using technologies' critical masses or stand-alone values.
Schlagwörter: 
Network Effects
Critical Mass
Coordination
Riskiness
JEL: 
C72
C91
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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