Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50418 
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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten
dc.contributor.authorVreeland, James Raymonden
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-21-
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-06T15:41:22Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-06T15:41:22Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.3929/ethz-a-005425741en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50418-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by UN Security Council membership.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute |cZurichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKOF Working Papers |x171en
dc.subject.jelO19en
dc.subject.jelO11en
dc.subject.jelF35en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordWorld Banken
dc.subject.keywordUN Security Councilen
dc.subject.keywordVotingen
dc.subject.keywordAiden
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Krediten
dc.subject.stwMitgliedschaften
dc.subject.stwInternationale Organisationen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleDevelopment aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn582965586en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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