Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48311 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 No. 34
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Abstract: 
In Mali, there exist various farm-cum-family structures, so that agricultural production occurs on plots controlled by different members of the household. In this paper, we want to lay emphasis on the under-researched differentials between collective and individual plots (attended by male or female farmer) in the context of extended family farms using input and output first hand data collected in the south-eastern part of Mali. First, we find that land yields are significantly larger on (male) private plots than on common plots with similar characteristics planted to the same crop in the same year after all appropriate controls have been included. And, second, we bring strong suggestive evidence that a moral hazard-in-team problem exists on the collective fields (yet only with regard to care-intensive crops) that could explain their relatively poor performance.
Subjects: 
Land productivity
family structure
moral-hazard-in-team problem
collective
JEL: 
D13
D57
J12
O12
O13
Q12
Q15
R20
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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