Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47496 
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dc.contributor.authorChristiansen, Vidaren
dc.contributor.authorSmith, Stephenen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-23-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-04T09:19:28Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-04T09:19:28Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47496-
dc.description.abstractMuch of the literature on externalities has considered taxes and direct regulation as alternative policy instruments. Both instruments may in practice be imperfect, reflecting informational deficiencies and other limitations. We analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination, to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour. We consider cases where taxes are either imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in externalities, or where some consumption escapes taxation. In both cases we characterise the optimal instrument mix, and show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) |cLondonen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIFS Working Papers |x09,16en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordPigouvian taxesen
dc.subject.keywordregulationsen
dc.subject.stwInternalisierung externer Effekteen
dc.subject.stwVerbrauchsteueren
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwPolicy-Mixen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleExternality-correcting taxes and regulation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn609943855en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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