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dc.contributor.authorEyckmans, Johanen
dc.contributor.authorKverndokk, Snorreen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:42:14Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:42:14Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47270-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate how moral concerns about permit trading affect an endogenous pollution permit trading equilibrium, where governments choose non-cooperatively the amount of permits they allocate to domestic industries. Politicians may feel reluctant to allow permit trading and/or may prefer that abatement is undertaken domestically due to moral concerns. This will have an effect on the initial permit allocations, and, therefore, on global emissions. The impact on global emissions depends on the precise formulation of the moral concerns, but under reasonable assumptions, we show that global emissions may increase. Thus, doing what is perceived as good does not always yield the desired outcome. However, this can be offset by restrictions on permit trading when governments have moral concerns about this trade.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2009,13en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelQ54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTradable emission permitsen
dc.subject.keywordinternational environmental agreementsen
dc.subject.keywordnon-cooperative game theoryen
dc.subject.keywordmoral motivationen
dc.subject.keywordidentityen
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Umweltpolitiken
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen
dc.subject.stwEthiken
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMoral concerns on tradable pollution permits in international environmental agreements-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn602493064en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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